

Message Text

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ACTION IO-10

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C O N F I D E N T I A L NASSAU 1616

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MARR BF US

SUBJ: MEETING WITH MINEXTAFF ADDERLEY: FACILITIES AGREEMENT

REF: NASSAU 1615 (NOTAL)

1. AS NOTED IN NASSAU 1615 MY MEETING WITH ADDERLEY THIS MORNING STARTED WITH A DISCUSSION OF THE U.S. POSITION WITH REGARD TO THE KOREAN RESOLUTION. WHEN WE CONCLUDED OUR DISCUSSION OF THIS MATTER AND IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT ADDERLEY WAS SURPRISED THAT I HAD NOT COME TO SPEAK OF THE FACILITIES AGREEMENT, I MENTIONED THAT IN FACT IT HAD BEEN MY INTENTION WHEN I SOUGHT A MEETING EARLIER THIS WEEK TO HAVE AN INFORMAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON HIS AUGUST 15 LETTER. HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF HIS LETTER TO ME OF YESTERDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, I THOUGHT PERHAPS IT WOULD BE BETTER TO HOLD OFF OUR DISCUSSION UNTIL I COULD PROVIDE HIM WITH AN INFORMED AND OFFICIAL POSITION. I NOTED THAT I HAD, OF COURSE, TRANSMITTED BOTH LETTERS TO WASHINGTON BUT HAD NOT AS YET RECEIVED A RESPONSE.

2. ADDERLEY WAS STILL OBVIOUSLY NOT SATISFIED AND EVIDENCED A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF UNEASE. HE WONDERED WHETHER, EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF AN OFFICIAL WASHINGTON RESPONSE, I COULD ENLIGHTEN
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HIM AS TO WHAT MY PERSONAL VIEWS WERE AS TO HOW WASHINGTON

MIGHT RESPOND TO THE GCOB PROPOSAL. I SAID THAT ON THAT BASIS I WOULD DO SO. MY OWN JUDGMENT WAS THAT THERE WAS NOT A PRAYER OF A CHANCE THAT WASHINGTON WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER ANY ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE. GIVEN THE PRESENT MOOD IN WASHINGTON AND IN PARTICULAR THE ATTITUDE IN THE CONGRESS TOWARD FOREIGN AID, WITH WHICH I HAD SOME DIRECT EXPERIENCE IN TESTIFYING ON THE HILL, IT SEEMED INCONCEIVABLE TO ME THAT ANY AID PROGRAM, NOT TO MENTION ONE OF THE MAGNITUDE WHICH THE GCOB HAD PROPOSED, COULD BE APPROVED. ADDERLEY RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT HE APPRECIATED MY PERSONAL ASSESSMENT, BUT THAT IF THAT WAS THE WASHINGTON RESPONSE THIS WOULD "CAUSE THEM CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTIES".

3. I SAID THAT IN MY VIEW, IF WASHINGTON ADVANCED WHAT I ANTICIPATED, I THOUGHT THAT THERE STILL SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT INDUCEMENT TO THE GCOB TO RENEGOTIATE A FACILITIES AGREEMENT. I SAID THAT EVEN IF, AS I ASSUMED, OUR RESPONSE TO THEIR LETTERS WERE TO CONTAIN A COUNTER-OFFER BASED UPON RENTAL PLUS OTHER ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS DIRECTLY DERIVING FROM OUR PRESENCE AT THE FACILITIES, THESE WOULD NOT ADD UP TO INCONSIDERABLE COMPENSATION. ADDERLEY REMAINED SKEPTICAL.

4. I SAID THAT I PERSONALLY FELT THAT THEY MIGHT BE UNDER A FALSE IMPRESSION CONCERNING THE VALUE OF THE FACILITIES IN THE BAHAMAS TO THE USG. I COMMENTED THAT IN PURELY COST EFFECTIVENESS TERMS IT WOULD BE FAR MORE ADVANTAGEOUS FOR US TO RELOCATE THE BASES THAN TO MEET THE TERMS WHICH THE GCOB HAD ADVANCED. ADDERLEY RESPONDED THAT OF COURSE HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT THE VALUE OF THE BASES WAS TO US AND THAT THIS WAS A MATTER FOR US TO DECIDE. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE SAID THAT FROM THEIR POINT OF VIEW THERE WERE OTHER "INTANGIBLES" THAT THEY HAD TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT. HE NOTED THAT WITHIN THE CARIBBEAN AND WITH REGARD TO VARIOUS OTHER STATES, THE BAHAMAS WAS SUBJECT TO CRITICISM BECAUSE OF THE EXISTENCE OF U.S. BASES ON THEIR TERRITORY. HE NOTED SPECIFICALLY A RECENT CONVERSATION WITH GUYANESE OFFICIALS IN WHICH THE LATTER HAD MADE THAT POINT. I SAID THAT I COULD UNDERSTAND THIS, BUT THAT I THOUGHT I KNEW THE VIEW OF THE SECRETARY AND INDEED OF THE USG WITH REGARD TO THIS AS A GENERAL PROBLEM. IT WAS OUR FEELING THAT IN CONNECTION WITH COUNTRIES WHERE WE ENJOYED THE PRIVILEGE OF HAVING MILITARY FACILITIES OR OTHERWISE HAD A MILITARY

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PRESENCE AND ASSOCIATION, IT WAS UP TO THOSE COUNTRIES TO DECIDE WHETHER THE BENEFITS WHICH THEY DERIVED FROM THAT ASSOCIATION WITH THE U.S. WERE OR WERE NOT IN THEIR INTEREST. IT WAS MY VIEW THAT SUCH COUNTRIES WOULD HAVE TO MAKE UP THEIR OWN MINDS AS TO WHETHER THEIR CONCERN FOR OTHER ASSOCIATIONS, AS CONTRASTED TO THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S. WAS OF GREATER IMPORTANCE. I SAID THAT IT WAS CERTAINLY CLEAR TO ME THAT A LARGE PART OF OUR CONGRESS AND OUR PEOPLE VERY MUCH TOOK THE VIEW THAT IF

WE WERE NOT WELCOME OVERSEAS AND IF THE CONTRIBUTIONS WHICH OUR PRESENCE MADE NOT JUST IN AN ECONOMIC SENSE BUT PERHAPS MORE GERMANELY, TO PEACE AND SECURITY, WERE NOT APPRECIATED WE WOULD BE WELL ADVISED TO GET OUT.

5. ADDERLEY NODDED AN UNDERSTANDING OF THESE COMMENTS BUT REPEATED THAT THEY HAD TO CONSIDER THE INTANGIBLES OF THE ATTITUDES OF OTHERS. I SAID THAT THAT WAS PRECISELY WHAT I WAS TALKING ABOUT AND THAT THEY THEREFORE HAD TO CONSIDER THE INTANGIBLES ON BOTH SIDES.

6. ADDERLEY ASKED IF WE COULD PROVIDE A REASONABLY PROMPT RESPONSE TO THEIR COMMUNICATIONS SINCE HE WOULD OF COURSE HAVE TO TAKE THE MATTER TO THE CABINET FOR CONSIDERATION AND THEY WERE VERY ANXIOUS TO WIND UP MATTERS BEFORE THE END OF DECEMBER. I SAID I WAS HOPEFUL THAT WE COULD PROVIDE A RAPID RESPONSE AND THAT I WAS STILL HOPEFUL THAT THEY WOULD FIND WITHIN THAT RESPONSE A BASIS FOR REACHING A FAVORABLE AGREEMENT.

7. COMMENTS ON FOREGOING AS WELL AS EMBASSY'S RECOMMENDED RESPONSE TO ADDERLEY LETTERS OF AUGUST 15 AND SEPTEMBER 25 FOLLOW SEPTTEL.
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